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Contemporary Turkey:
A Country of Tense Coexistence
Fatma Muge Gocek

I. Introduction

T

he most significant characteristic that distinguishes Turkey today
is the tense coexistence of the East and the West within. This is evident
in its political structure, in which a popularly elected Islamist government is in power within the only secular state in the world with a Muslim population ratio of 99%. It is visible in the arena of personal rights,
where even though the Constitution guarantees the right to education
for all of its citizens, women wearing the Islamic headscarf are banned
from getting a public education. And it is revealed in its spatial politics, since women dressed in miniskirts are just as likely to be expelled
from Islamist coffeehouses as those in Islamic attire are asked to leave
Western-style discotheques. It is critical to understand the dynamics of
this schizophrenic coexistence, in which one segment of society defines
itself as the epitome of modernization, civilization, and the West, while
another segment, which appears more religiously oriented and cognizant of the East, has become even more vocal in the post-September
11 world, especially in the recent context of the war being fought to
“bring democracy to Islam.” Since contemporary Turkey has spent a
long time negotiating the uneasy relationship between Islam and politics, this essay analyzes the dynamics of this relationship through the
history of republican Turkey.
Scholars who specialize in the Middle East have studied this problematique in depth, but they do so by highlighting the structural and
institutional conditions necessary to bring about a truly participatory
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political system.1 What is frequently overlooked is the spectrum of
societal meanings of these concepts across time and space. This essay
argues that it is specifically this spectrum that determines a particular
political outcome. Therefore, it focuses on the formation and transformation of meanings around the particular East-West dynamics in
contemporary Turkey. Doing so identifies Turkey’s major social actors
and institutions from the moment of their arrival in the Middle East as
well as the meanings these actors and institutions create as they live
through history.
Since the personal is political and objectivity is an often imaginary
reality, one could argue that the tense coexistence of the East and West
is the focus of this essay because of my particular life story. As a Turkish citizen who spent the first twenty-five years of her life in Turkey
to then become an American citizen living in the United States for
the next twenty-two years, my life itself has been a microcosm of the
struggle between two societies that are so different yet also similar.
This personal factor extends into the professional as I research how
the East and West were constructed as concepts throughout history,
and how non-Western societies in general and Turkey in particular
negotiated these concepts. It has also become evident how much the
post-September 11 world context has shaped the particular perspective
through which I approach contemporary Turkey, given my attempts to
make sense of why so much terror and suffering have been inflicted in
the name of, and, at the same time, in opposition to Islam. Hence, my
hope is that this essay will illuminate the social dynamics of Turkish
society and reveal the complexity of the relationship between Islam
and democracy, thus reevaluating the efficacy of the agenda that the
United States government is actively promoting in Iraq.
Let me start with a disclaimer: even though the main question of
the essay is posed in terms of an East-West tension, my intention is to
demonstrate that what currently exists is not, as some scholars claim, a
“clash of civilizations,”2 but rather a coalescence of them. The analysis
of contemporary Turkey demonstrates how different elements from
the East and West merge into a complex mosaic, one whose pattern
must be urgently identified in order to allay the world conflict we
are currently enmeshed in. The origins of the shape, style, and content of that mosaic, this essay argues, can be traced to the European
Enlightenment and the modernity project it infused in the rest of the
world.3 The negotiation of this fusion created certain dynamics in all
non-Western societies in general, and in predominantly Islamic ones in
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particular.4 Turkey, as one such country, commenced this negotiation
in the 18th century, while still an empire. After the Ottoman Empire
slowly dissolved while struggling with the forces of modernity during
the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Turkish nation-state continued
the struggle into the 21st century.
II. Historical Antecedents of the Turkish Republic:
The Emergence and Rise of the Ottoman Empire
The history of the Turkish Republic in Anatolia can be traced back
to the 10th and 11th centuries, when the adverse climatic conditions
in Central Asia led to the initial westward migration of Turcoman
tribes into the Fertile Crescent. The settled urban Islamic empires of
the region needed to contain this volatile population and employed
some of the tribesmen as mercenaries, gradually directing the rest
away from the urban centers toward their northern frontiers with the
Byzantine Empire. During the process of migration, these nomadic
tribes adopted Islam, replacing their shamanistic religions. It should
be noted that this somewhat late conversion of the Turks to Islam was
to become a significant factor that Arab communities in the region
employed whenever they wanted to delegitimate the eventual Turkish
rule that was established over their lands.
The organized raids carried out by these nomadic tribes into the
Anatolian territories of the weakening Byzantine Empire eventually led to the formation of many Turkic principalities at the expense
of the Byzantines. The principality closest to the Byzantine Empire,
which was established circa 1299 in Nicea, was to eventually transform
into the dynasty of the house of Osman, later known as the Ottoman
Empire. This particular principality came into being as the Turks first
gained a foothold in the region by serving as mercenaries to the Byzantine emperor, and then forming strategic alliances with the local Byzantine potentates against him. The 14th and 15th centuries witnessed
their expansion at the expense of both the other Turkish principalities
and the Byzantine Empire.5
The Ottoman mode of expansion was always westward. Even
though this was initially because of their choice of conducting conquests against the infidel Byzantines instead of the other Turkish Muslim principalities, it eventually became symbolically affixed as the
Ottomans continued to define their identity in relation to Europe. The
location of the imperial capitals demonstrates this choice: the capitals
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moved westward from Nicea, Bursa, Adrianople (Edirne) in the Balkans. After having surrounded the Byzantine Empire from both the
east and the west, the Ottomans eliminated the Byzantine Empire with
the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, which they immediately made
their own capital until their demise in 1922. Their westward orientation would later bring the criticism—one that they themselves would
occasionally agree with or take issue with—that they were never truly
Islamic in character. It is interesting to note in this context that through
the 600-year rule of the Ottoman dynasty, none of the Ottoman sultans
ever undertook the Islamic obligation defined as one of the five pillars
of Islam. Not one Ottoman sultan conducted a pilgrimage to the Holy
Lands of Mecca and Medina, even though they were a part of the Ottoman imperial territories for many centuries.6
Yet the structure of rule established in the Ottoman Empire naturalized the superiority of Muslims in society.7 Only the Muslims could
bear arms, rise politically to the ranks of the ruling elite, and pass these
privileges on to their offspring. Still, the Ottoman Empire granted
many social, economic, and political privileges to the non-Muslims
living amongst them, privileges that were particularly significant at a
time when such religious minorities were being persecuted throughout Europe. The Ottoman administration was able to do so through
the establishment of the Millet system, whereby the imperially designated Ottoman minorities of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were given
rights to self-govern in return for paying a special poll tax (cizye). The
tax was levied in return for military protection, and legal responsibility devolved to the communal leaders for the actions of their particular communities.8 Fully integrated into the empire economically,
they could hold significant administrative posts, especially as they
pertained to finance. Yet, unlike the Muslims, their political privileges
were restricted to their persons because their social contact with the
Muslim society at large was carefully regulated. Not only did the Ottoman minorities wear specific attire that visibly marked them as nonMuslim, but they could not pass their political privileges on to their
children. The latter was due to the fact that marriage and therefore
inheritance across the non-Muslim/Muslim divide was strictly forbidden. Only through converting to Islam and thereby giving up all their
communal ties were these minorities allowed to fully integrate into
Ottoman Muslim society at large. Still, the presence of this West in
their own society endowed the Ottoman Empire with a vigor that led
to their rapid expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries.
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The eastward expansion of the Empire fully commenced in the 16th
century, mostly at the expense of the Persian Empire, the Mamluks
of Egypt, and other local Islamic states. The Ottoman defeat of the
Mamluks in 1520 was particularly significant in that the Ottoman sultans captured and brought to Constantinople the symbolic post of
the Islamic Caliphate, which had been held by the Egyptian rulers. In
doing so, the Ottoman Empire attained the symbolic leadership of the
Muslim world, a post held until 1924, when the newly formed Turkish
Republic abolished the Caliphate. (It is interesting to note at this juncture that in the message transmitted by Al-Jazeera television, Osama
bin Laden traces the start of the demise of the Muslim world at the
hands of the West to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the
abolition of the Caliphate.)
III. The Onset of the Ottoman Retraction and
Increased Interaction with the West
The Ottoman state established an empire, the boundaries of which
extended at its height from the gates of Vienna in the West, to the
Arabian Peninsula in the East, to the shores of North Africa in the
Southwest. Scholars trace the commencement of the period of imperial retraction to the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1699.9 Indeed, the
Ottoman Empire was able to expand until it encountered similar imperial powers. The emerging Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires
in the West and the Persian Empire in the East delimited the Ottoman
borders. The 18th century was the period when the Ottoman state,
cognizant of the European Enlightenment and the subsequent political, economic, and military transformations there, became interested in
reforming the Empire along Western lines.10
It was at this juncture that they sent the first Ottoman ambassador
to the court of Louis XV with the intent “to observe Western civilization and report on what could be learned and applied from it.” I
studied this encounter in depth in my first book, East Encounters West:
France and the Ottoman Empire in the 18th Century.11 While the impact
of this encounter in France was limited to the appearance of a brief
fashion of “Turquerie” in the French court, in the Ottoman Empire it led
to the eventual transformation of the entire social structure. Because
military victories produced and sustained empires, the first institution the Ottoman state set out to “modernize” (a term that eventually
became synonymous with “Westernize”) was the military. In order
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to maintain a well-drilled standing army in the European manner, it
became necessary for the Ottoman administration to not only change
military recruitment (which in turn was connected to the existing tax
and land revenue systems that also had to be reformed), but also to
create military academies to educate the recruits, a special treasury
to pay them, and modern hospitals to heal them. These Western-style
institutions also came embedded with certain new ideas: the conceptions of liberty, equality, and fraternity of the French Revolution were
the most significant.12 The new societal contract implied in these ideas
was addressed not to imperial subjects but to potential citizens. These
citizens had to have equal rights and responsibilities regardless of their
religion and other communal identities. Their loyalty was not to be
directed to an omnipotent sultan, but instead to the abstract notion of
a state that respected their rights. It was, therefore, not surprising that
once the Ottoman state introduced these Western-style institutions,
the Ottoman military students who received this education gradually
started to aspire to the equality of all Ottoman subjects and to profess
loyalty not to the person of the sultan, as they had formerly done, but
instead to the idea of an Ottoman constitutional state that would represent them all.13
This new social contract required individuals to construct their
political and social identity as citizens. The first step in the transition
from imperial subjecthood to citizenship commenced with attempts
to formulate an Ottoman Constitution, initially during the period of
reform referred to as the Tanzimat Period. The efforts to formulate an
Ottoman Assembly followed soon after, in 1856. Not surprisingly, it
was the Ottoman military cadre, now educated in Western-style military academies, that spearheaded the reform movement and, in the
process, became more and more involved in politics.14 Yet there was
another significant social group that was affected by the European
ideas of education and political representation: the religious minorities of Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. They likewise started to insist on
political equality and full access to the Ottoman administration.15 Yet
among the two groups, the military had a much more central location
and more power within the state. When the sultan failed to promulgate the necessary reforms, it was the young Westernized military cadres that intervened in 1908 to replace him and to establish an Ottoman
Parliament. From that point onward, the state and the sultan (who
used to represent the state in his person) had to share political power
with the military.
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The burgeoning political identity of the Westernized military and
the religious minorities developed in similar yet ultimately different
directions. While both groups attempted to sustain the concept of a
multicultural Ottoman identity, the increasing European presence in
the domestic affairs of the Empire, as well as the search of both groups
for an identity from within their own pasts (which had developed
differently because of the dynamics of the Millet system), led them
to come up with disparate solutions. In the volume I edited entitled
Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East, I studied the emergence of these disparate solutions by comparatively analyzing the
Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms within the Ottoman
Empire.16 Even though the dynamics in each one was the same, each
nevertheless imagined their own to be unique. Because the Turkish
Muslims formed the ruling element of the Empire, it was eventually
Turkish nationalism that prevailed at the expense of all the others.
Even though the ruling elite attempted to hold on to a unifying Ottoman identity that would have sustained the Empire, the 1908 war in
Tripoli against the Italians, the 1910–1912 Balkan wars, and eventually
World War I polarized national identities to the point of no return.
The Balkan wars were especially significant in this polarization.
When the Ottomans were defeated by the Balkan powers, hundreds of
thousands of Muslim Turks (who had been living in the Balkans since
the 14th century) had to flee to the Ottoman capital to avoid being massacred. They were eventually settled in the central lands of the Empire,
namely in Anatolia. Yet these Anatolian lands were the location of the
emerging Greek and Armenian nationalisms as well. With the surge of
incoming Muslim Turks, the Ottoman state—now under the sway of
Turkish nationalism—eliminated the local Greek, Armenian, and Arab
populations to replace them with their ethnic coreligionists.17
IV. Toward the Demise of the Ottoman Empire
In my book entitled Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman
Westernization and Europe, I tried to comprehend how and why, from
the 18th century onward, the dynamics of Ottoman Westernization
were not able to preserve the Empire.18 The European Enlightenment
had advantaged the bourgeoisie in spearheading social transformations throughout Europe. What distinguished the burgeoning Ottoman bourgeoisie from the European one, however, was its multi-ethnic
character. Therefore, unlike the European bourgeoisie, it could not pool
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its social, economic, and political resources across the Millet divide to
transform the Empire. The newly forming Turkish bourgeoisie eliminated its Greek, Armenian, and Jewish components in the name of
nationalism and, by doing so, destroyed the only chance it had of preserving the Empire.
This process of elimination occurred as follows.19 On the eve of
World War I, the Ottoman Empire was ruled by the Committee of
Union and Progress, which was comprised of Westernized mid-level
mostly Turkish Muslim military officials and politicians. The leaders
of the Committee were without exception Muslim Turks of Balkan
origin who no longer had a home to which to return. In addition to
their ensuing fervent Turkish nationalism, these men had received an
Enlightenment education. This led them to legitimate their group in the
name of progress and the secularism of science, and thus marginalize
the former legitimating ideology of religion. Hence, nationalism and
science became the two guiding principles of the new conception of
rule. It was at this juncture that the Ottoman Empire joined World War
I on the side of the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian Empires.
During the war, nationalism took further root. The English and French
states that often intervened in the domestic affairs of the Empire in the
name of protecting the Ottoman minorities were now the enemy.20 The
Ottomans engaged in an unchecked process of ethnic cleansing that
reduced the numbers of Greeks and Armenians in the Empire.21 The
Armenians were especially hard hit in this process because, unlike the
Greeks, they did not have a homeland to which to return. Prejudice
fostered by the social divide of the Millet system rapidly turned into
aggression; the Balkan defeats and the consequent massacre of Muslims further worsened existing relations between the ruling Muslim
Turks and the Ottoman minorities.
The financial success of the minority bourgeoisie, who did not serve
in the military and instead served as middlemen in the growing trade
relations with Europe, increased significantly.22 This accumulation of
wealth was looked upon unfavorably by the Muslims, especially by
those who had fled from the Balkans as well as those whose male family members had been serving in the Ottoman military for almost a
decade. The wealth was at first frowned upon, and then sanctioned.
The minorities were deported or forced to flee and their confiscated
property and goods were distributed among the Muslim Turks, who
set about establishing a national Turkish bourgeoisie at all costs. The
1915 deportation and massacres committed against the Armenians,
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the deportation of Greeks, and later the migration of the Jews to Palestine all rapidly altered the composition of the Ottoman population.
The Muslim Turks of the Balkans were settled in where the Ottoman
minorities were divided. Hence, the multi-hued fabric of the Ottoman
Empire transformed into the solid color of a nation-state.23
V. The Formation of the Turkish Republic
After the Ottoman Empire lost World War I with devastatingly large
numbers of casualties, it was an Ottoman general from the now lost
Ottoman Balkan city of Salonica who was chosen by the now defunct
Committee of Union and Progress to lead a war of independence
against the occupying Allied Forces. Mustafa Kemal was a very able
general who united the Turks and successfully led them in “throwing
the occupying forces out” of what Turks considered to be their homeland.24 True to his Westernized education, Mustafa Kemal first formulated a National Assembly in Ankara, away from the former capital
Constantinople (also known as Istanbul), which was still occupied by
the Ottoman sultan and the Allied Forces. As the Allied Forces tried to
bring the perpetrators of the massacres against the Ottoman minorities
to justice in Istanbul—and deported the prominent Ottoman statesmen
responsible to the island of Malta—many who were not apprehended
escaped to Ankara to join forces with Mustafa Kemal.25 The Turkish
Nationalists thus fought yet another war during 1919–1922, ultimately
forcing the Allied Forces to withdraw from the central lands of the
Empire. It was at this juncture that the conflict with Greece reached its
pinnacle: the British had allowed the Greeks to invade Asia Minor to
reclaim Western Anatolia as their own. The Turks thus fought a war
of independence mainly against these Greek forces. The islands of the
Aegean quickly became points of contention between the two countries
as each laid down their claims. And thus began the fractious relationship between Greece and Turkey that still continues today.
The former lands of the Empire left outside the boundaries of the
new Turkish state were also fraught with problems. In the Balkans, the
Serbs, Albanians, Greeks, and Bulgarians further negotiated their territorial boundaries through conflicts that have continued until the present. In the East, the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire became
the French and British protectorates of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The Kurds became divided across
three countries: while some remained in Turkey, others were within
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the lands of the new states of Iraq and Syria. It was the British division
of these provinces that was to cause so much continued havoc in the
Middle East because the provinces were portioned out in accordance
with natural boundaries, such as rivers, rather than by the ethnic and
communal identities of the peoples residing in them. Syria has never
given up its claims on Lebanon, for example. The Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein initially invaded Kuwait because he claimed those lands
should have belonged to Iraq in the first place. Cyprus, which was
occupied by the British, contained Greek and Turkish communities
that have coexisted uneasily since then. Hence, one could claim that all
the current areas of conflict in the Middle East came into being through
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
Turkish identity became the unifying force of the newly founded
Republic of Turkey. The only institution that managed to survive the
transition from empire to new nation-state semi-intact was the military, which then formed, with the help of the bureaucratic administration, the backbone of the new republic after the War of Independence.
Mustafa Kemal exchanged his military costume with the civilian suit
of a statesman and set out to construct the new republic. His fifteenyear rule, from 1923 until his death in 1938, was marked by a series
of radical reforms that made Turkey a secular republic, its face turned
unswervingly to Europe with the intent to “join the ranks of the civilized nations of the West.”26 The legal system was one of the first to be
reformed. A multi-tiered legal system had employed Western laws for
legal matters concerning the Westerners in the Empire, Islamic laws of
the sharia for matters pertaining to the Muslims, and laws promulgated
by the sultan (kanun) when there was no legal precedent. It was now
replaced by a new unified secular amalgam of laws borrowed from
countries that seemed “most similar to Turkey in character,” namely,
commercial laws from Italy, civic laws from France, and personal laws
from Switzerland.
The second most important reform was the unification of the educational system. The traditional Islamic education that existed side
by side with the new Western-style education, complemented by the
minority and missionary education for the Ottoman minorities and
European foreigners, were united into one centralized unit. The history of the Turkish Republic was narrated in the textbooks along the
lines that Mustafa Kemal had delivered in a six-day-long lecture.27
Religion as a subject was removed from all schools except at the university level where it was taught as an academic subject, and then was
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offered solely to those specializing in religion. (It should be noted that
this lack of proper religious education probably accounts for some of
the quandaries faced by contemporary Turkey in comprehending the
boundaries and implications of governance by a party that defines
itself as having a strong Islamic component.) All the knowledge thus
conveyed through the educational system was carefully crafted along
nationalist lines that created a distant historical past for Turkey that
went beyond the Ottoman Empire to the imagined lands of Central
Asia. The language was purified of “foreign” influences as new words
of Turkic origin were constructed.28
These significant structural reforms enabled the new republican
state to control the production and regulation of knowledge through
education, and social behavior through law. They were complemented
by a series of reforms defining Turkey’s cultural and political location
in the world. The alphabet reform replaced Arabic script with the Latin
one, thereby effectively severing the epistemological ties of the Turks
with their Ottoman past. This reform was complemented with the calendar reform whereby the Muslim use of Friday as the day of rest was
replaced by Sunday in order to be more like the “civilized” countries
of the West. The lunar calendar was superceded by the Roman one,
and the traditional time keeping was replaced by the European one.
The French Jacobin separation of church and state was also adopted
in toto, effectively removing religion from the public space into the
private.29 Gone were the religious foundations, sects, and orders. All
religion in the public sphere was overseen by the newly established
Republican Office of Religious Affairs. Marriages, divorces, and all
legal arrangements concerning family life were no longer based on
Islamic law but instead on civic laws adopted from the West. Gone,
too, was the religious attire of the sheikhs and other religious leaders;
it could only be worn within the confines of religious institutions. And
the attire of the new republican citizen was likewise reformed. Mustafa
Kemal gave a public speech in one of the most conservative Anatolian
cities, where he wore a hat, claiming that “this is called a hat, it is what
the civilized Europeans wear, and what the Turks who are going to
join the ranks of civilized countries are to wear from then on.”30 A few
revolts against the Western attire in general and the hat in particular—because its wide brim was especially detrimental to performing
the Islamic ablutions—were summarily put down through a number
of public hangings.
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It is interesting to note that no such regulations of attire were introduced for women; instead, Mustafa Kemal educated them by example.
All the women in his retinue were dressed in the latest European fashion and wore no headscarves. Women were also immediately handed
the right to vote and be elected, without a social struggle. They proceeded to join the workforce like their European counterparts in their
desexualized business suits, their hair tightly bound in a chignon.31 I
analyzed the dynamics of gender in the Middle East in general and
Turkey in particular in the volume I edited, entitled Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, Power. The volume analyzes the
dynamics of the Turkish feminist movement that developed in such
a state-centered manner.32 In all, the republican state employed these
reforms to create a totally secular social structure legitimated by the
modernity of the civilized West instead of the “traditional” Ottoman
Muslim past, and manned by an urban secular citizen that professed
loyalty to the Turkish nation.
Yet there was one significant flaw in this transformation through
radical reforms: the reforms did not take hold throughout the society.
They remained confined to urban centers and the newly burgeoning
secular national middle class.33 The state also had to vigilantly guard
the boundaries of secularism because every attempt to make the transition from the initial single-party system to a multi-party system ended
up mobilizing the masses around the issue of Islamic religion. The first
two attempts to found an opposition party occurred during Mustafa
Kemal’s reign; in both cases, he handpicked some of his friends to form
such parties against the Republican People’s Party (RPP), of which he
was the founder and the leader.34 Even though his friends argued that
such opposition parties could only take root in society if they did not
run against the party of Mustafa Kemal, and suggested that he consider stepping down as leader of the RPP to instead become the politically non-aligned president of the entire country, he chose to remain
in political control. Ultimately, as the opposition parties drew a lot of
popular support and the populace started to turn increasingly against
the RPP, Mustafa Kemal had no choice but to shut down both parties.
VI. Transition to a Multi-Party System and the Cold War
The third and successful Turkish attempt to transition to a multi-party
system occurred after the Second World War under the tutelage of
Ismet Inonu, Mustafa Kemal’s trusted friend and fellow general, who
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had succeeded him after 1938 primarily because he had the support of
the military. Official Turkish historiography narrates this transition as
Inonu deciding on his own that the time had come for RPP to educate
the Turkish populace about acquiring a multi-party system, but I agree
with scholars who point out the extraneous factor that forced Inonu’s
hand: Turkey would not have been permitted to join NATO had it
not undertaken such a transition.35 Yet this process, which occurred
after 1948, proved to be a rather difficult one. Once again, during the
national elections, religion emerged as the main social issue around
which the opposition mobilized. The newly established Democrat
Party (DP) won the elections by a landslide and started to undertake a
series of changes that decreased the influence of the military. As there
was not a strong leader like Mustafa Kemal to contain the increasing
popularity of the Party and protect the privileges of the state bureaucracy, Democrat Party rule ended in 1960 with the first military coup in
republican history. The opposition party was once again harshly suppressed and a number of the DP leaders were tried and hanged.
The military intervention set a pattern that kept repeating itself
approximately once every decade thereafter.36 The military ostensibly intervened to preserve the republic. It abolished the government,
changed the Constitution, tried and sentenced dissidents, punished
party leaders or abolished the parties, then held elections, turned political power over to the elected government, and left. They left every
time because of Mustafa Kemal’s maxim that “the Turkish military
should not get involved in politics and ultimately belongs in the barracks.” Yet, ironically, it was another maxim of Kemal that legitimated
their intervention each and every time, and this one stated that, “the
military are the guardians of the Turkish republic.” Each time, the
grounds for intervention was a religious threat since the military interpreted the political activities of a party with Islamist tendencies to be
undermining the foundations of the republic. No one had the power to
contest this interpretation.
It should be noted that Kemal had initially identified another social
group, along with the military, as the guardians of the republic—the
Turkish youth. But since they had no arms, they could never accumulate enough power to exercise their historical right and responsibility.
Instead, most of the political activities of the Turkish youth were sanctioned by the military and the government because of their leftist tendencies. The major factor behind this sanction was the need to protect
the existing political distribution of power, but an equally significant
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one was the strategic alliance Turkey had chosen to form with the
United States during the Cold War.37 Since Turkey had extensive borders with the Soviet Union, the U.S. government elected to form close
political ties with Turkey in order to contain the Soviet Union. In the
process, it advised Turkey to crack down on the domestic leftist movements under the assumption that all of these were formed to bring
about a revolution to establish communism. The flip side of this advice
was the bolstering of rightist religious movements under the assumption that such movements were not revolutionary but conservative,
and therefore geared to sustain the status quo. Hence, the Turkish
military suppressed and decimated leftist movements and leftist intellectuals in the name of stamping out communism. It fostered instead
culturally conservative religious movements.
The military had not been willing to accept the presence of Islamic
religion in political life as it was defined, interpreted, and introduced
by the populace. On the contrary, it formulated a nationalist civic
version of Islam that was termed “the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.”38
This version defined religion culturally, in terms of the practices the
Turks themselves had introduced to Islam. Religion was to flourish
only under the total control of the state rather than the community of
believers. It is therefore not surprising that some retired generals were
among the founding members of the predecessors of the Islamist party
that is now in power. This occurred from the 1950s until the 1980s.
With the decimation of the left and the nurturance instead of conservative elements, the military had irretrievably tipped the balance of
power in Turkish society in favor of the conservative groups. Soon it
could not contain the increased political participation of the Islamists.
So the military had to abandon advocating “the Turkish-Islamic synthesis” and once again start to actively oppose the Islamists and take
a very public political stand against them. They were aided in this
endeavor by all the other Turkish political parties that had developed
under state tutelage, since all had started to lose significant segments
of their voters to these upstarts.
This veiled presence of the military in Turkish political life needs to
be studied in further detail because the military is ironically regarded
as the major force that preserves democracy, according to some secular segments of population, or that very much hinders it, according to
other more religiously oriented segments. The military have always
legitimated their intervention in political life on the grounds of the
historical role the great leader Mustafa Kemal bequeathed upon them.
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And they have always claimed their intervention to be “above politics”
because they do not belong to any political party. They have also put
forth the argument that their eventual departure from the political
sphere after each military intervention demonstrates that their action
was not based on their own interests but on the interests of the nation.
They have further justified their frequent interventions on the grounds
that it is the lack of trustworthy, responsible politicians that forces them
to take such action. All of these arguments overlook how the frequent
military interventions infantilize the Turkish politicians by enabling
them to assume a political position without bestowing upon them the
power to practice it and take responsibility for the consequences of
their actions. In the meanwhile, the military keeps deciding what its
annual budget ought to be without any checks or balances, and this
undisclosed figure keeps being accepted by the Turkish Parliament
without any discussion whatsoever. It should be noted here that it is
estimated that the Turkish military receives about 65% of the annual
budget (another 15% goes to paying back the IMF, which leaves the
Turkish government about 20% on which to run the entire country).
VII. Economic and Social Liberalization after the 1980s
The last military intervention, which occurred in 1982, was different
from the earlier ones on a number of levels. In an attempt to curb the
“dangerous” ideologies that seem to keep infesting Turkish society,
the military decided to systematically spread instead the one ideology that kept legitimating their intervention: Kemalism. This official
ideology penetrated every corner of the country as everything from
roads to school buildings to parks became infused with images of
Mustafa Kemal. Special institutions to study Kemalism were established at many universities and prizes were given for the best works
on the great leader. Yet all these activities failed to engage in a critical
dialogue with what comprised Kemalism and how it could meet the
evolving needs of Turkish society. Instead, they promoted state ideology, upheld secularism, and suppressed any critical analysis.39
Another major difference of the 1982 military intervention was that
the mixed economy (dominated by state monopolies and a state-protected domestic market) and the national bourgeoisie faced a serious
crisis.40 The lack of market competition had bloated these monopolies and slowed down the economy; the revenues of the military had
likewise suffered. Strong economic measures had to be undertaken in
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order to keep the country solvent. The military therefore permitted an
economic liberalization policy that was started under the tutelage of a
new conservative rightist political party, the Motherland Party (MP),
led by Turgut Ozal.41 With this policy, Turkey was to leave behind
state protection over the economy and let domestic industries face the
challenges of the world markets. This liberalizing move was especially
painful for the secular national bourgeoisie that had developed under
the protective wings of the state, and that had supported the hegemony of the state and the military in the political sphere in return for
profits in the economic sphere. Yet this bourgeoisie was particularly
ill suited for such a move because they had initially been brought into
existence by the Turkish state through the confiscation of the wealth
and businesses of the departing minorities. They therefore lacked the
initial skills to build and sustain businesses over the long term.
Although this economic liberalization was, and still is, painful, it
nevertheless introduced two very significant new forces into Turkish society. The first came about with the abolition of state control
over communications, which bolstered civil society. The other was the
opportunity to establish direct contact with global businesses without
the mediation of the state, which produced a new social group of provincial Anatolian bourgeoisie.
As businesses needed to have direct access to information in order
to compete in the world markets, the state monopoly over communications (radio, telephone, and television) was summarily abolished. In
1984, within months, hundreds of radio and television stations, and
later cellular phone companies, mushroomed throughout Turkey.42
Access to information brought along hours-long chat shows on television about social issues as the Turkish public saw and defined itself
through the silver box. Radio stations transmitted messages of all sorts
in all political colors, often discussing the particular dynamics of Turkish society. As television cameras covered every corner of the country,
especially in the 1990s, it was hard to prevent the surfacing of both the
complicit behavior of the bourgeoisie, often in the form of white-collar
crime, and the undercover intelligence activities of the military, often
directed against its own populace and politicians. Hence, the state
apparatus and its co-dependent bourgeoisie, now under increased
scrutiny, appeared more and more corrupt and compromised.
The communications revolution and the opening up of world markets fueled the emergence of a new social group, a provincial bourgeoisie that had been marginalized by the state and big businesses
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for their relatively smaller size as well as their aspiration to define
their identity through religious values. This bourgeoisie was religious
but not traditional. As it had been socialized in the secular educational system of the Republic with the ideals of Western modernity, it
ended up employing technology to its fullest. It therefore managed to
develop what has since been called an “alternate modernity,” one that
combines a religiously conservative self-definition with technologically cutting-edge business acumen.43 The accumulation of economic
resources by this new social group, aptly named the “Anatolian Tigers”
after the Southeast Asian economic powerhouses, ultimately enabled
the political success of the Islamist Justice and Development Party
(JDP) that is in power in Turkey today. Previous opposition parties in
republican history had always been formed with state approval and
had drawn extensively on the resources of the state; in return, they had
never been able to refuse state tutelage in their political actions. Yet the
economic liberalization of the 1980s produced a new bourgeoisie that
could generate, for the first time, resources outside the control of the
state. This bourgeoisie then invested these resources in a political party
that developed in spite of fierce opposition from both the Turkish state
and the military.44
VIII. Turkey’s Contested Location in the New World Order
The JDP and its intellectual predecessor, which was the Welfare Party
(WP), advocated an economically liberal program that was targeted
at both the religious and the secular segments of society.45 In addition, unlike the existing mainstream parties, it developed new political
tactics to form an extensive voter base. The WP and later the JDP studied cutting-edge U.S. political campaign management skills. The JDP
generated computer databases of voters, conducted opinion surveys
every three months to pinpoint campaign issues, and actively recruited
members.46 I personally remember how in 1990, when a Turkish colleague and I conducted a survey of the Islamist movement in Turkey,
we wanted to compare our results with those we assumed had been
collected by the political parties. When we contacted the parties, we
were surprised to find out that out of all of them, only the WP had
conducted statistically rigorous surveys and could therefore provide
comparative data for us.
Yet, in spite of this political mobilization and technological sophistication, the leaders of the JDP seemed painfully aware that the Party still
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remained at the mercy of the military insofar as the latter controlled
both the state apparatus as well as the republican narrative portraying
the military as the guardians of Turkish democracy and secularism. In
addition, the opening of Turkey to the world markets had revealed the
urgency for Turkey to join an economic consortium within which to
weather the exigencies of the world market. Since Turkey had aspired
from its inception to be a part of Europe, it had applied for European
Union (EU) membership very early, in 1963.47 The secular bourgeoisie
wanted to join the EU because its economic interests in the world market would be bolstered and protected within such a union. The Islamist
bourgeoisie likewise saw the economic benefits from such a merger. In
addition, they saw in the EU a political ally. As the EU promoted the
exercise of democracy and human rights in all its member states, it
would protect the right of the JDP to remain in Turkish political life
against the threats of the military. These threats had become especially significant after the post-1982 formation of the National Security
Council (NSC) by the military to further control Turkish political life.
This council still functions at a level above the president, National
Assembly, and the confines of the legal system. It was no accident that
one of the first stipulations of the EU, in order for Turkey to qualify for
membership, was the abolition of the NSC. The military was naturally
opposed to this on grounds of national security.
This potential EU membership has generated a very interesting
realignment in Turkish politics. For the first time since the inception
of their relationship, the state bureaucracy, dominated by the military
and the secular bourgeoisie it fostered, developed divergent interests.
While the secular bourgeoisie realized that its interests lay with the
EU, the state bureaucracy quickly became aware that any engagement
with the EU would severely curb its power, both in terms of control
over the economy (through the privatization of state monopolies) and
the society (through the abolition of the NSC). And for the first time,
the economic and political interests of the secular and Islamist bourgeoisies became aligned. Both wanted EU membership and aspired
to bring democratic practices and political stability to Turkey in order
to accomplish it. It is this political standstill, with the military finding
itself on the wrong side of the global equation in opposition to the
secular bourgeoisie, which has enabled the current domestic political
situation to persist without the political intervention of the military.
Even though the portrayal above depicts EU membership as the
panacea to all of Turkey’s problems, there are still significant obstacles
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to such a peaceful solution. The most significant obstacle lies within
the structure of the EU. Because member countries are politically represented in the European Assembly according to population size, the
very large Turkish population would guarantee it significant political
clout at the outset. And the balance of power between the southern
and northern countries of the EU, which is now dominated by the
northern powers (England, France, Germany, Scandinavian countries)
would shift to the advantage of the southern ones (Spain, Portugal,
Italy). In addition, Turkey has to fulfill a significant number of domestic reforms. It has to improve its human rights record, abolish trials for
crimes of thought, enable the self-expression of ethnic and religious
minorities such as the Kurds and Assyrians, and acknowledge the
crimes committed against these and other minorities in history, especially against the Armenians and Greeks. The most significant obstacle
to such a public acknowledgment of past and present crimes is the still
strong Turkish nationalism that is constantly fostered by the Turkish
military and the state bureaucracy that they have trained and socialized after their own image. Any thought or action that might challenge/criticize the Republic is still punishable by law.48
Also, Turks are constantly inundated with the nationalist rhetoric
that the whole world is against them and they should therefore keep
defending themselves and always expect the worst. It should be noted,
however, that this nationalist instinct was recently undermined by a
natural phenomenon, the devastating earthquake in 2000 that led to
more than 30,000 deaths. As rescue efforts were immediately brought
under scrutiny, two facts became very clear. First, the state bureaucracy was totally unprepared and ineffectual in mobilizing to help the
victims.49 The military, in turn, employed its forces to first rescue and
evacuate a military base instead of helping out the populace. Emerging
triumphant were civil society organizations of students as well as nonprofit organizations, which quickly set up social support networks.
The nationalist rhetoric that Turks have no friends in the world was
proven thoroughly wrong as help poured in from all over. Still, these
developments are relatively recent and have not been in place long
enough to sustain democracy in Turkish society.
IX. Conclusion
I want to conclude with a discussion of the most significant factor hindering the possibility of a robust democratic Turkey in the future: the
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imagined presence of an East-West divide in general, and a religioussecular divide in particular. Even though the East and West have had a
long tradition of coexistence in Turkey, there are still very few people
in the country who are willing to acknowledge this coexistence. The
staunchly secular and Westernized military and their bourgeoisie still
insist on defining Turkey solely as a modern, Westernized nation, one
that has not, should not, and could not have an Islamic identity, which
they see as traditional, backward, and uncivilized. For them, since the
West and its modernity has been defined in Enlightenment terms as
the ultimate triumph of science over religion, modernity over tradition, and secularism over Islam, being civilized means being European
and therefore certainly not Islamic. As they have been socialized in an
educational system formulated on the radically secular Jacobin model
of secularism, Islam for them is the “Other” they do not know, an
evil monster lurking within spidery cobwebs, one that could at any
moment emerge to drag and topple Turkey into nothingness. Even
though they unwillingly acknowledge that the Islamist government
in Turkey has not, after one and a half years, brought about a religious
revolution like that in Iran, they still believe it is cloaking its true intention of destroying the Turkish republic. Overcoming this deep mistrust
of Islam is still extremely hard for the dominant secular state and its
bourgeoisie. In the meanwhile, the Islamist bourgeoisie is constantly
professing its loyalty to Turkish secularism in order to allay this fear.
And they still have not generated enough knowledge or accumulated
adequate experiences to define themselves on their own terms, for
what they are rather than what the secular bourgeoisie claims them to
be.
When Colin Powell, in an attempt to provide a positive model for
Iraq and also to gently pave the way to pass the occupational torch to
Muslim political allies of the United States, declared that, “what they
aimed to accomplish in Iraq was an Islamist democracy like those in
Turkey and Pakistan,” there was a major outcry in Turkey.50 “How
dare Mr. Powell define us as a Muslim democracy?!”, decried the secularists, pointing out that Turkey is a constitutionally secular modern
democracy. And how could they be compared to Pakistan, when Turkey has always measured itself against the Western democracies? The
Islamist government defended Mr. Powell’s statement by querying,
“wasn’t it natural for him to refer to the democracy the Turks had
established for themselves as a Muslim one since 99% of the people in
Turkey were Muslims?”51
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This debate demonstrates the distance Turkey still needs to traverse
before establishing a true democracy. Bridges need to be built between
the liberal segments of both the secularist and Islamist bourgeoisies.
Only then will it become clear that what makes countries like Turkey
unique is the long coexistence of the East and West, rather than the
East against the West. In the 21st century, no one can afford to hold
onto or create such binaries. 
•
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